- Nov 11, 2019 What is a WEP Key? A WEP key is an outdated security passcode for Wi-Fi devices. Bradley Mitchell. An MIT graduate who brings years of technical experience to articles on SEO, computers, and wireless networking. 104- or 128-bit WEP: 26 digit key; 256-bit WEP: 58 digit key.
- What is a valid WEP key? WEP encryption uses 24 bit 'Initilization Vector' in addition to the 'secret key' ( 40 bit for 64 bit WEP, 104 bit for 128 bit WEP, etc.). Therefore, 64 bit WEP can be refered to by some vendors as 40 bit WEP, and 128 bit can be referedo to as 104 bit, depending on the interpretation. MAC Address OUI.
If that manufacturer uses the 24-bit internal trigger key, you may only be able to use a 40-bit entry. That is technically called 64-bit BASE encryption. For many of the encryption depths, we offer both full and base choices. Select the quantity of characters in the ASCII character pool.
| Perfect Passwords GRC's Ultra High Security Password Generator | |
| 2,571 sets of passwords generated per day 33,540,663 sets of passwords generated for our visitors | |
Wep Key 128 Bit Generator Reviews
not simple. So here is some totally random raw material, generated just for YOU, to start with. Every time this page is displayed, our server generates a unique set of custom, high quality, cryptographic-strength password strings which are safe for you to use: |
64 random hexadecimal characters (0-9 and A-F):
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63 random printable ASCII characters:
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63 random alpha-numeric characters (a-z, A-Z, 0-9):
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| Click your web browser's 'refresh' button a few times and watch the password strings change each time. What makes these perfect and safe? Also, because this page will only allow itself to be displayed over a snoop-proof and proxy-proof high-security SSL connection, and it is marked as having expired back in 1999, this page which was custom generated just now for you will not be cached or visible to anyone else. Therefore, these password strings are just for you. No one else can ever see them or get them. You may safely take these strings as they are, or use chunks from several to build your own if you prefer, or do whatever you want with them. Each set displayed are totally, uniquely yours — forever. The 'Application Notes' section below discusses various aspects of using these random passwords for locking down wireless WEP and WPA networks, for use as VPN shared secrets, as well as for other purposes. The 'Techie Details' section at the end describes exactly how these super-strong maximum-entropy passwords are generated (to satisfy the uber-geek inside you). |
Application Notes: A note about 'random' and 'pseudo-random' terminology: There are ways to generate absolutely random numbers, but computer algorithms cannot be used for that, since, by definition, no deterministic mathematical algorithm can generate a random result. Electrical and mechanical noise found in chaotic physical systems can be tapped and used as a source of true randomness, but this is much more than is needed for our purposes here. High quality algorithms are sufficient. The deterministic binary noise generated by my server, which is then converted into various displayable formats, is derived from the highest quality mathematical pseudo-random algorithms known. In other words, these password strings are as random as anything non-random can be. This page's password 'raw material': 64 hex characters = 256 binary bits: |
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| Each of the 64 hexadecimal characters encodes 4 bits of binary data, so the entire 64 characters is equivalent to 256 binary bits — which is the actual binary key length used by the WiFi WPA pre-shared key (PSK). Some WPA-PSK user interfaces (such as the one in Windows XP) allows the 256-bit WPA pre-shared key to be directly provided as 64 hexadecimal characters. This is a precise means for supplying the WPA keying material, but it is ONLY useful if ALL of the devices in a WPA-protected WiFi network allow the 256-bit keying material to be specified as raw hex. If any device did not support this mode of specification (and most do not) it would not be able to join the network. Using fewer hex characters for WEP encryption: WEP key strength (key length) is sometimes confusing because, although there are only two widely accepted standard lengths, 40-bit and 104-bit, those lengths are sometimes confused by adding the 24-bit IV (initialization vector) counter to the length, resulting in 64-bit and 128-bit total key lengths. However, the user only ever specifies a key of either 40 or 104 binary bits. Since WEP keys should always be specified in their hexadecimal form to guarantee device interaction, and since each hex digit represents 4 binary bits of the key, 40 and 104 bit keys are represented by 10 and 26 hex digits respectively. So you may simply snip off whatever length of random hex characters you require for your system's WEP key. Note that if all of your equipment supports the use of the new longer 256/232 bit WEP keys, you would use 232/4 or 58 hexadecimal characters for your pre-shared key.
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| The more 'standard' means for specifying the 256-bits of WPA keying material is for the user to specify a string of up to 63 printable ASCII characters. This string is then 'hashed' along with the network's SSID designation to form a cryptographically strong 256-bit result which is then used by all devices within the WPA-secured WiFi network. (The ASCII character set was updated to remove SPACE characters since a number of WPA devices were not handling spaces as they should.)
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| If some device was not following the WiFi Alliance WPA specification by not hashing the entire printable ASCII character set correctly, it would end up with a different 256-bit hash result than devices that correctly obeyed the specification. It would then be unable to connect to any network that uses the full range of printable ASCII characters. Since we have heard unconfirmed anecdotal reports of such non-compliant WPA devices (and since you might have one), this page also offers 'junior' WPA password strings using only the 'easy' ASCII characters which even any non-fully-specification-compliant device would have to be able to properly handle. If you find that using the full random ASCII character set within your WPA-PSK protected WiFi network causes one of your devices to be unable to connect to your WPA protected access point, you can downgrade your WPA network to 'easy ASCII' by using one of these easy keys. And don't worry for a moment about using an easy ASCII key. If you still use a full-length 63 character key, your entire network will still be EXTREMELY secure. And PLEASE drop us a line to let us know that you have such a device and what it is!
When these passwords are used to generate pre-shared keys for protecting WPA WiFi and VPN networks, the only known attack is the use of 'brute force' — trying every possible password combination. Brute force attackers hope that the network's designer (you) were lazy and used a shorter password for 'convenience'. So they start by trying all one-character passwords, then two-character, then three and so on, working their way up toward longer random passwords.
Note that while this 'the longer the better' rule of thumb is always true, long passwords won't protect legacy WEP-protected networks due to well known and readily exploited weaknesses in the WEP keying system and its misuse of WEP's RC4 encryption. With WEP protection, even a highly random maximum-entropy key can be cracked in a few hours. (Listen to Security Now! episode #11 for the full story on cracking WEP security.)
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While the diagram above might at first seem a bit confusing, it is a common and well understood configuration of standard cryptographic elements. A succinct written description of the algorithm would read: 'Rijndael (AES) block encryption of never-repeating counter values in CBC mode.' CBC stands for 'Cipher Block Chaining' and, as I describe in detail in the second half of Security Now! Episode #107, CBC provides necessary security in situations where some repetition or predictability of the 'plaintext' message is present. Since the 'plaintext' in this instance is a large 128-bit steadily-increasing (monotonic) counter value (which gives us our guaranteed never-to-repeat property, but is also extremely predictable) we need to scramble it so that the value being encrypted cannot be predicted. This is what 'CBC' does: As the diagram above shows, the output from the previous encryption operation is 'fed back' and XOR-mixed with the incrementing counter value. This prevents the possibility of determining the secret key by analysing successive counter encryption results. One last detail: Since there is no 'output from the previous encryption' to be used during the encryption of the first block, the switch shown in the diagram above is used to supply a 128-bit 'Initialization Vector' (which is just 128-bits of secret random data) for the XOR-mixing of the first counter value. Thus, the first encryption is performed on a mixture of the 128-bit counter and the 'Initialization Vector' value, and subsequent encryptions are performed on the mixture of the incrementing counter and the previous encrypted result. The result of the combination of the 256-bit Rijndael/AES secret key, the unknowable (therefore secret) present value of the 128-bit monotonically incrementing counter, and the 128-bit secret Initialization Vector (IV) is 512-bits of secret data providing extremely high security for the generation of this page's 'perfect passwords'. No one is going to figure out what passwords you have just received. How much security do 512 binary bits provide? Well, 2^512 (2 raised to the power of 512) is the total number of possible combinations of those 512 binary bits — every single bit of which actively participates in determining this page's successive password sequence. 2^512 is approximately equal to: 1.34078079 x 10^154, which is this rather amazing number:
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Gibson Research Corporation is owned and operated by Steve Gibson. The contents of this page are Copyright (c) 2016 Gibson Research Corporation. SpinRite, ShieldsUP, NanoProbe, and any other indicated trademarks are registered trademarks of Gibson Research Corporation, Laguna Hills, CA, USA. GRC's web and customer privacy policy. |
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a security algorithm for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. Introduced as part of the original 802.11 standard ratified in 1997, its intention was to provide data confidentiality comparable to that of a traditional wired network.[1] WEP, recognizable by its key of 10 or 26 hexadecimal digits (40 or 104 bits), was at one time widely in use and was often the first security choice presented to users by router configuration tools.[2][3]
In 2003 the Wi-Fi Alliance announced that WEP had been superseded by Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). In 2004, with the ratification of the full 802.11i standard (i.e. WPA2), the IEEE declared that both WEP-40 and WEP-104 have been deprecated.[4]
WEP was the only encryption protocol available to 802.11a and 802.11b devices built before the WPA standard, which was available for 802.11g devices. However, some 802.11b devices were later provided with firmware or software updates to enable WPA, and newer devices had it built in.[5]
History[edit]
WEP was ratified as a Wi-Fi security standard in 1999. The first versions of WEP were not particularly strong, even for the time they were released, because U.S. restrictions on the export of various cryptographic technology led to manufacturers restricting their devices to only 64-bit encryption. When the restrictions were lifted, it was increased to 128-bit. Despite the introduction of 256-bit WEP, 128-bit remains one of the most common implementations.[6]
Encryption details[edit]
WEP was included as the privacy component of the original IEEE 802.11 standard ratified in 1997.[7][8] WEP uses the stream cipherRC4 for confidentiality,[9] and the CRC-32 checksum for integrity.[10] It was deprecated in 2004 and is documented in the current standard.[11]
Standard 64-bit WEP uses a 40 bit key (also known as WEP-40), which is concatenated with a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to form the RC4 key. At the time that the original WEP standard was drafted, the U.S. Government's export restrictions on cryptographic technology limited the key size. Once the restrictions were lifted, manufacturers of access points implemented an extended 128-bit WEP protocol using a 104-bit key size (WEP-104).
A 64-bit WEP key is usually entered as a string of 10 hexadecimal (base 16) characters (0–9 and A–F). Each character represents 4 bits, 10 digits of 4 bits each gives 40 bits; adding the 24-bit IV produces the complete 64-bit WEP key (4 bits × 10 + 24 bits IV = 64 bits of WEP key). Most devices also allow the user to enter the key as 5 ASCII characters (0–9, a–z, A–Z), each of which is turned into 8 bits using the character's byte value in ASCII (8 bits × 5 + 24 bits IV = 64 bits of WEP key); however, this restricts each byte to be a printable ASCII character, which is only a small fraction of possible byte values, greatly reducing the space of possible keys.
A 128-bit WEP key is usually entered as a string of 26 hexadecimal characters. 26 digits of 4 bits each gives 104 bits; adding the 24-bit IV produces the complete 128-bit WEP key (4 bits × 26 + 24 bits IV = 128 bits of WEP key). Most devices also allow the user to enter it as 13 ASCII characters (8 bits × 13 + 24 bits IV = 128 bits of WEP key).
A 152-bit and a 256-bit WEP systems are available from some vendors. As with the other WEP variants, 24 bits of that is for the IV, leaving 128 or 232 bits for actual protection. These 128 or 232 bits are typically entered as 32 or 58 hexadecimal characters (4 bits × 32 + 24 bits IV = 152 bits of WEP key, 4 bits × 58 + 24 bits IV = 256 bits of WEP key). Most devices also allow the user to enter it as 16 or 29 ASCII characters (8 bits × 16 + 24 bits IV = 152 bits of WEP key, 8 bits × 29 + 24 bits IV = 256 bits of WEP key).
Authentication[edit]
Two methods of authentication can be used with WEP: Open System authentication and Shared Key authentication.
In Open System authentication, the WLAN client does not provide its credentials to the Access Point during authentication. Any client can authenticate with the Access Point and then attempt to associate. In effect, no authentication occurs. Subsequently, WEP keys can be used for encrypting data frames. At this point, the client must have the correct keys.
In Shared Key authentication, the WEP key is used for authentication in a four-step challenge-response handshake:
- The client sends an authentication request to the Access Point.
- The Access Point replies with a clear-text challenge.
- The client encrypts the challenge-text using the configured WEP key and sends it back in another authentication request.
- The Access Point decrypts the response. If this matches the challenge text, the Access Point sends back a positive reply.
After the authentication and association, the pre-shared WEP key is also used for encrypting the data frames using RC4.
At first glance, it might seem as though Shared Key authentication is more secure than Open System authentication, since the latter offers no real authentication. However, it is quite the reverse. It is possible to derive the keystream used for the handshake by capturing the challenge frames in Shared Key authentication.[12] Therefore, data can be more easily intercepted and decrypted with Shared Key authentication than with Open System authentication. If privacy is a primary concern, it is more advisable to use Open System authentication for WEP authentication, rather than Shared Key authentication; however, this also means that any WLAN client can connect to the AP. (Both authentication mechanisms are weak; Shared Key WEP is deprecated in favor of WPA/WPA2.)
Weak security[edit]
Because RC4 is a stream cipher, the same traffic key must never be used twice. The purpose of an IV, which is transmitted as plain text, is to prevent any repetition, but a 24-bit IV is not long enough to ensure this on a busy network. The way the IV was used also opened WEP to a related key attack. For a 24-bit IV, there is a 50% probability the same IV will repeat after 5,000 packets.
In August 2001, Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir published a cryptanalysis of WEP[13] that exploits the way the RC4 ciphers and IV are used in WEP, resulting in a passive attack that can recover the RC4 key after eavesdropping on the network. Depending on the amount of network traffic, and thus the number of packets available for inspection, a successful key recovery could take as little as one minute. If an insufficient number of packets are being sent, there are ways for an attacker to send packets on the network and thereby stimulate reply packets which can then be inspected to find the key. The attack was soon implemented, and automated tools have since been released. It is possible to perform the attack with a personal computer, off-the-shelf hardware and freely available software such as aircrack-ng to crack any WEP key in minutes.
Cam-Winget et al.[14] surveyed a variety of shortcomings in WEP. They write 'Experiments in the field show that, with proper equipment, it is practical to eavesdrop on WEP-protected networks from distances of a mile or more from the target.' They also reported two generic weaknesses:
- the use of WEP was optional, resulting in many installations never even activating it, and
- by default, WEP relies on a single shared key among users, which leads to practical problems in handling compromises, which often leads to ignoring compromises.
In 2005, a group from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation gave a demonstration where they cracked a WEP-protected network in three minutes using publicly available tools.[15] Andreas Klein presented another analysis of the RC4 stream cipher. Klein showed that there are more correlations between the RC4 keystream and the key than the ones found by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir which can additionally be used to break WEP in WEP-like usage modes.
In 2006, Bittau, Handley, and Lackey showed[2] that the 802.11 protocol itself can be used against WEP to enable earlier attacks that were previously thought impractical. After eavesdropping a single packet, an attacker can rapidly bootstrap to be able to transmit arbitrary data. The eavesdropped packet can then be decrypted one byte at a time (by transmitting about 128 packets per byte to decrypt) to discover the local network IP addresses. Finally, if the 802.11 network is connected to the Internet, the attacker can use 802.11 fragmentation to replay eavesdropped packets while crafting a new IP header onto them. The access point can then be used to decrypt these packets and relay them on to a buddy on the Internet, allowing real-time decryption of WEP traffic within a minute of eavesdropping the first packet.
In 2007, Erik Tews, Andrei Pychkine, and Ralf-Philipp Weinmann were able to extend Klein's 2005 attack and optimize it for usage against WEP. With the new attack[16] it is possible to recover a 104-bit WEP key with probability 50% using only 40,000 captured packets. For 60,000 available data packets, the success probability is about 80% and for 85,000 data packets about 95%. Using active techniques like deauth and ARP re-injection, 40,000 packets can be captured in less than one minute under good conditions. The actual computation takes about 3 seconds and 3 MB of main memory on a Pentium-M 1.7 GHz and can additionally be optimized for devices with slower CPUs. The same attack can be used for 40-bit keys with an even higher success probability.
In 2008 the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council updated the Data Security Standard (DSS) to prohibit use of WEP as part of any credit-card processing after 30 June 2010, and prohibit any new system from being installed that uses WEP after 31 March 2009. The use of WEP contributed to the TJ Maxx parent company network invasion.[17]
Remedies[edit]
Use of encrypted tunneling protocols (e.g. IPSec, Secure Shell) can provide secure data transmission over an insecure network. However, replacements for WEP have been developed with the goal of restoring security to the wireless network itself.
802.11i (WPA and WPA2)[edit]
Wep Key 128 Bit Generator Free
The recommended solution to WEP security problems is to switch to WPA2. WPA was an intermediate solution for hardware that could not support WPA2. Both WPA and WPA2 are much more secure than WEP.[18] To add support for WPA or WPA2, some old Wi-Fi access points might need to be replaced or have their firmware upgraded. WPA was designed as an interim software-implementable solution for WEP that could forestall immediate deployment of new hardware.[19] However, TKIP (the basis of WPA) has reached the end of its designed lifetime, has been partially broken, and had been officially deprecated with the release of the 802.11-2012 standard.[20]
Implemented non-standard fixes[edit]
WEP2[edit]
128 Bit Password Generator
This stopgap enhancement to WEP was present in some of the early 802.11i drafts. It was implementable on some (not all) hardware not able to handle WPA or WPA2, and extended both the IV and the key values to 128 bits.[21] It was hoped to eliminate the duplicate IV deficiency as well as stop brute force key attacks.
After it became clear that the overall WEP algorithm was deficient (and not just the IV and key sizes) and would require even more fixes, both the WEP2 name and original algorithm were dropped. The two extended key lengths remained in what eventually became WPA's TKIP.
WEPplus[edit]
WEPplus, also known as WEP+, is a proprietary enhancement to WEP by Agere Systems (formerly a subsidiary of Lucent Technologies) that enhances WEP security by avoiding 'weak IVs'.[22] It is only completely effective when WEPplus is used at both ends of the wireless connection. As this cannot easily be enforced, it remains a serious limitation. It also does not necessarily prevent replay attacks, and is ineffective against later statistical attacks that do not rely on weak IVs.[23]
Dynamic WEP[edit]
Dynamic WEP refers to the combination of 802.1x technology and the Extensible Authentication Protocol. Dynamic WEP changes WEP keys dynamically. It is a vendor-specific feature provided by several vendors such as 3Com.
The dynamic change idea made it into 802.11i as part of TKIP, but not for the actual WEP algorithm.
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^IEEE Standard for Information Technology- Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems-Local and Metropolitan Area Networks-Specific Requirements-Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications. IEEE STD 802.11-1997. November 1997. pp. 1–445. doi:10.1109/IEEESTD.1997.85951. ISBN1-55937-935-9.
- ^ abAndrea Bittau; Mark Handley; Joshua Lackey. 'The Final Nail in WEP's Coffin'(PDF). Retrieved 2008-03-16.Cite journal requires
|journal=(help) - ^'Wireless Adoption Leaps Ahead, Advanced Encryption Gains Ground in the Post-WEP Era' (Press release). RSA Security. 2007-06-14. Archived from the original on 2008-02-02. Retrieved 2007-12-28.
- ^'What is a WEP key?'. Archived from the original on April 17, 2008. Retrieved 2008-03-11. -- See article at the Wayback Machine
- ^'SolutionBase: 802.11g vs. 802.11b'. techrepublic.com.
- ^Fitzpatrick, Jason (September 21, 2016). 'The Difference Between WEP, WPA and WAP2 Wi-Fi Passwords'. How to Geek. Retrieved November 2, 2018.
- ^Harwood, Mike (29 June 2009). 'Securing Wireless Networks'. CompTIA Network+ N10-004 Exam Prep. Pearson IT Certification. p. 287. ISBN978-0-7897-3795-3. Retrieved 9 July 2016.
WEP is an IEEE standard introduced in 1997, designed to secure 802.11 networks.
- ^Walker, Jesse. 'A History of 802.11 Security'(PDF). Rutgers WINLAB. Intel Corporation. Archived from the original(PDF) on 9 July 2016. Retrieved 9 July 2016.
IEEE Std 802.11-1997 (802.11a) defined Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).
- ^'WPA Part 2: Weak IV's'. informit.com. Archived from the original on 2013-05-16. Retrieved 2008-03-16.
- ^'An Inductive Chosen Plaintext Attack against WEP/WEP2'. cs.umd.edu. Retrieved 2008-03-16.
- ^IEEE 802.11i-2004: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements(PDF). 2004. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2007-11-29. Retrieved 2007-12-18.
- ^Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, David Wagner. 'Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11'(PDF). Retrieved 2006-09-12.Cite journal requires
|journal=(help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^Fluhrer, Scott; Mantin, Itsik; Shamir, Adi (2001). 'Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4'(PDF).
- ^Cam-Winget, Nancy; Housley, Russ; Wagner, David; Walker, Jesse (May 2003). 'Security Flaws in 802.11 Data Link Procotols'(PDF). Communications of the ACM. 46 (5): 35–39.
- ^'Wireless Features'. www.smallnetbuilder.com.
- ^Tews, Erik; Weinmann, Ralf-Philipp; Pyshkin, Andrei. 'Breaking 104 bit WEP in less than 60 seconds'(PDF).
- ^Greenemeier, Larry (May 9, 2007). 'T.J. Maxx data theft likely due to wireless 'wardriving''. Information Week. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ^'802.11b Update: Stepping Up Your WLAN Security'. networkmagazineindia.com. Retrieved 2008-03-16.
- ^'WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY'(PDF). Proxim Wireless. Retrieved 2008-03-16.Cite journal requires
|journal=(help) - ^'802.11mb Issues List v12'(excel). 20 Jan 2009. p. CID 98.
The use of TKIP is deprecated. The TKIP algorithm is unsuitable for the purposes of this standard
- ^'WEP2, Credibility Zero'. starkrealities.com. Retrieved 2008-03-16.
- ^'Agere Systems is First to Solve Wireless LAN Wired Equivalent Privacy Security Issue; New Software Prevents Creation of Weak WEP Keys'. Business Wire. 2001-11-12. Retrieved 2008-03-16.
- ^See Aircrack-ng